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The starting point of this paper is  the idea that trade unions and individual workers pay 
attention to wage settlements in similar sectors of the economy. The foundations of this 
concept can be found in other social sciences and also in the literature of psychological 
economics. However, it has not received much attention in connection to union decision 
making. This comparison or reference  wage  enters the decision making of the union  (i.e. the  
union utility function).  In this paper, we employ a union utility function which incorporates this 
concept. The analysis is conducted in a bargaining framework and the results show the effects 
on the optimal wage of important variables like comparison wage, unemployment benefit, 
union power and of the weight that the union places on the comparison wage 
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Social comparisons theories have  a long history in the social sciences and  they  
have  provided numerous insights in many research fields. In  economics, the concept of 
comparison income or wage belongs to this general theoretical framework. One of the first 
systematic uses of the idea of comparison (relative) wage with important analytic 
consequences can be found in Keynes (1936 [1973], pp.13-14). The next notable extension 
of the concept was the relative consumption hypothesis based on the notion of relative 
income in Duesenberry’s  (1949) book. It was followed by  the work of  Easterlin  who  
formulated the  hypothesis that  well-being depends on relative income, not absolute 
income (Easterlin, 1974 and also Easterlin, 2001). Furthermore, the idea has been used by 
a number of  behavioural economists in a variety of theoretical settings (for a review see 
Baxter, 1993). In the last decades, its fruitfulness has  been realized by an increasing 
number of economists and thus it has started to be used in connection to labour 
economics.  
The idea that unions and workers compare wages with others has been expressed in 
a plethora of terms such as relative wage, fair wage,  aspiration wage, comparison or target 
wage.  [see for instance, Oswald (1979, 1986), Layard (1980),  Frank (1984), Gylfason and 
Lindbeck (1984, 1986), Summers (1988),  Lommerud (1989), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), 
Chappell and Sampson (1990), Clark and Oswald (1996), Drakopoulos (1996), 
Drakopoulos and Theodossiou (1997), Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998), 
Charness and Grosskopf (2001) and Altman (2001)]. It has gained  analytical strength  with 
empirical studies indicating that wage settlements in key sectors of the economy determine 
settlements in other sectors (e.g. Jacoby and Mitchell,1990). The concept has also been 




Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Drakopoulos, forthcoming). Furthermore, the idea of comparison 
wage has been used extensively in other social sciences  especially in the context of equity 
theory and motivation theory (see Sweeny, 1990; Levine, 1993; Ambrose and Kulik, 1999; 
Deci and Ryan, 2000).  
With this in mind, the paper utilises a union utility function that incorporates the idea 
that there is a comparison or reference wage which affects union utility. The  comparison or 
reference wage can be linked to the previous wage level in a Keynesian framework and to 
the rest of the industry's wage settlements.  The paper suggests that unions compare their 
wage with other wages in the sector and this  implies that this reference wage enters the 
union utility function. Thus the  paper will start with a discussion of  the concept of 
comparison wage and its possible empirical manifestations in wage settlements. Part III will 
construct a simple model of union behaviour incorporating the idea of wage comparisons. 
Subsequently, in part IV there will be a discussion of the comparative static results and a 
comparison with those of the conventional approach. Finally, a concluding section will close 
the paper.  
 
II. Wage Settlements and Comparison Wage 
 
Empirical evidence seems to support the idea of interdependent wage decisions 
among industries in US and in many European countries (see for instance, de la Croix, 
1994; Urban, Palm and de la Croix, 2000). More specifically, there are indications that  for 
many years "key groups" industries in US manufacturing determine to a large extent wage 
changes in "non-key Groups" industries (Eckstein and Wilson,1962; Flanagan 1976; 
Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein, 1993: McBride, 2001). In Germany, wage settlements in 
one region and for a specific sector or industry act  as indicators for others. For example, 




wage round as an important benchmark  (Fitzenberger and Franz, 1999). In Sweden, wage 
changes in the non-manufacturing sector were found to be influenced by changes in the 
manufacturing sector  and that outside or reference wages  are quite important for wage 
setting at the local level  (Jakobsson and Lindbeck, 1971; Holmlund and Skedinger, 1990). 
There is also empirical support for relative wage considerations in Italy and Belgium (Galizzi 
and Lang, 1998; de la Croix, 1993). Further empirical evidence points to the idea that the 
notion of fair wage (connected to national or industry's level) is very important in union 
negotiations in the US (Jacoby and Mitchell,1990; de la Croix, 1994 and for specific 
empirical studies Gramm and Schnell, 2001). On the individual worker level, Clark and 
Oswald (1996) found that workers care about comparison wage rates (see also Van de 
Stadt, Kapteyn, and Van de Geer, 1985; McBride, 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). 
Furthermore, Hamermesh (1975) and Skott (2005) maintain that interdependence affects 
not only the decisions of  workers but also of firms. 
The phenomenon of wage interdependence can not easily be explained by the 
conventional approaches to union objectives. They usually ascribe it to union preferences 
and other factors without specifying how those preferences can be the source of such 
behaviour. However, the above findings combined with empirical results at the individual 
worker level, can easily be explained by employing the idea of comparison wages: unions 
and workers do not care only about their own wages but also about other unions wage 
settlements. This implies that the inclusion of own wages only in the union objective 
function might be seriously incomplete. On the contrary there are a number of  theoretical 
reasons which can justify the importance of a comparison or reference wage in union utility 
(see Clark and  Oswald,1996 and Frank,1997).  
One possible  justification can be found in Keynes's views. It  is well known that in 




of his underemployment equilibrium analysis. He pointed out that the main  reason why 
workers resist a cut in money wages is to maintain their relative position in the wage 
structure and not so much  to avoid a cut in their absolute income. Thus the reference wage 
can be linked to the average wage settlement in the industry or to the previous year  wage 
rate (Keynes, 1973, pp.13-14). The theme of  wage relativity is thus very important in 
Keynes and the subsequent Keynesian inspired literature (see for instance, the papers in 
Rotheim, 1998). In particular, some Keynesian oriented economists have employed it 
recently in wage setting and business cycle models (e.g. Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho 
Mariscal 1998; Danthime and Kurmann, 2004). In the same spirit, Gylfason and Lindbeck 
(1984) employ the idea that unions wage decisions are interdependent, in the sense that a  
union aspires to an appropriate wage by taking into account the rest of the industry's wage 
or the average national wage.  Analogous views can be found in the work of Frank (1984).  
Another  possible theoretical justification of the reference wage can be on the 
grounds of asymmetric response to over-pay and under-pay and to the level of pay that is 
seen as the "fair" amount. Evidence from experimental psychology seems to support the 
role of such response (e.g. Taylor,1982; Deci and Ryan, 2000). A signalling interpretation 
might be an additional  justification. In particular, the wage agreed by firm A might be a 
signal, containing information about market conditions affecting firm B (see for instance 
Chappell and Sampson, 1990). 
The theoretical justification concerning the importance of comparison wage can be 
extended to the individual worker level. The foundations of such an approach  can be found 
in the behavioural and psychological economics literature. More specifically, a hierarchical 
structure of needs implies that the individual  is motivated to meet unrealized needs step by 
step starting with the most important needs ( for the basic argument see Maslow, 1954 and 




lower order needs alters in the sense that what was deemed a luxury a few years ago 
becomes a necessity today (Kaufman, 1989 and Berry, 1994). Thus there will be 
unsatisfied needs and this is equivalent to the difference between reference income and 
actual income (see also Baxter, 1993 and Altman, 2001). 
Furthermore, the importance of the idea of comparing rewards with others  can be 
placed in the general framework of sociological, psychological and managerial perspectives 
which contain theories such as social comparison theory, reference group theory, relative 
deprivation theory, adaptation level theory, dissonance theory and equity theory (see for 
instance Festinger, 1954; Adams, 1963; Martin 1981; Greenberg,1990; Deci and Ryan, 
2000) and for surveys see Kapteyn and Wansbeek 1982, Baxter 1988 and Earl, 1990). In 
the specific form of the comparison wage, it can also be found  in other social study fields 
(see Homans,1961; Valenzi and Andrews, 1971; Sweeny, 1990; Kahnemann et al 1997). 
Given the above, we can construct a union utility function which  contains a 
comparison  wage. In particular, the comparison  wage enters the utility function and 
provides negative utility. Thus the union’s utility is  based positively  on union’s wage but 
negatively  on  the reference wage. 
 
 
III. The Model 
 
Having in mind the previous discussion, one can construct a union utility function 
which  incorporates the idea of comparison wage. As was mentioned, the setting of w* can 
be related to the previous income level or to a perception of the "appropriate" income. (For 
a further discussion on this issue see Oswald, 1986, Summers 1988, Akerlof and 
Yellen,1990 and Clark and Oswald, 1996; Corneo and Jeanne, 2001). In particular, the 




utility that w* gives can be linked to general formulations where deviation from a social 
norm causes a loss of utility (see Bernheim, 1994; Frank, 1985; Lindbeck, 1997; Clark and 
Oswald 1998; Cooper, Garcia-Penalosa and Funk, 2001; Stutzer, 2004). It can also be 
supported by  empirical evidence which shows  the negative impact on utility of a rise in 
comparison income (see for instance, Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004). Thus the union’s utility is  based positively  on union’s wage but negatively  
on  the comparison wage. For simplicity, the union is assumed to have a utilitarian 
maximand  Φ, defined as the sum of utilities of its employed and unemployed members. 
 
  Φ = Ν(αw –βw*) + (Μ-Ν)b                                     (1) 
 
Where w is the wage rate, w* the reference or comparison  wage, N  is  the number of trade 
union members who are employed, M is the number of union members and b is the 
unemployment benefit. It also holds that α>β and Μ>Ν (interior solution) and that    αw > 
βw*. 
The comparison wage can be conceived as a mark-up of the other’s sector wage or 
the industry wage. Thus  
w* = (1+ µ) ÿ                   (2) 
 
where ÿ is the industry wage and µ is the mark-up. Thus union utility becomes: 
Φ = Ν(αw –β(1+ µ) ÿ) + (Μ-Ν)b                                     (3) 
 
The firm employs N workers to produce output f(N) according to  





The firm’s profits are given as  
Π = pf(N) –wN                 (5) 
 
Where p denotes product price.  
 
The wage rate is determined by negotiation between the firm and the union which has M 
members. Given the wage, employment is determined by the demand for labour, so that 
 
 f’(N) = w                (6) 
 
Therefore employment can be written as  
N = g(w) with g’(w) < 0          (7)  
 
 
IV.  Bargaining and Comparative Statics 
 
The firm and the union negotiate over the wage w, according to a Nash bargain, 
following which employment N = g(w) is determined according to relation (6). Without loss of 
generality, we can normalize both the firm’s fallback profits and the union’s fallback utility at 








Where s is the union’s bargaining power. If s=1 then the model corresponds to the Monopoly 
Union model. If 0<s<1 it corresponds to the “Right to manage” model. The Nash bargaining 






Max B = [Ν(αw –β(1+ µ) ÿ) + (Μ-Ν)b]s [pf(N) –wN] 1-s       (9) 
  w 
 
The aim now is  to see how the bargained wage and therefore employment alter in response 
to changes in the exogenous variable. The general first order condition is the following: 
 
Bw = sΦw/Φ    + (1-s) Πw/Π = 0    (10) 
 
We can write the following partial derivatives (also noting that N= g(w)). 
 
Φw    = g’(w)[ αw –β(1+ µ) ÿ] + g(w) – g’(w)b  > 0     (11) 
Φwb  = -g’(w)   > 0                                                     (12) 
Φb     = M- g(w)  > 0                                                  (13) 
Φwÿ  = -g’(w) β(1+ µ)  > 0                                         (14) 
Φÿ     = -g(w) β(1+ µ)  < 0                                         (15) 
Φwµ  = -g’(w) β ÿ        > 0                                         (16) 
Φµ    = -g(w) β ÿ          < 0                                         (17) 
Φwα  = g’(w)w +g(w)  < > 0                                       (18) 
Φα    = g(w)w             > 0                                          (19) 




Φβ    = -g(w) ÿ (1+ µ)  < 0                                         (21) 
 
In order to proceed, we differentiate along relation (10) noting that Φw >0, and we obtain the 
following comparative statics: 
 
∂w       -Bwθ               
---- =     -----        (22) 




Where θ is an exogenous variable. Furthermore we assume that the second order conditions 
hold. 
Β
 ww  < 0      (23) 
 
Given (22) and (23) we have: 
 
sign(∂w/∂θ) = sign(Bwθ) 
 







                     s(ΦΦwθ -Φw Φθ )        (1-s) (ΠΠwθ –ΠwΠθ) 
Bwθ  =            ---------------------  +     --------------------------      (24) 
                               Φ
2
                              Π
2
 
Given the all the above we can deduce the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1 
An increase (decrease) in the industry (comparison) wage causes the union wage to increase 
(fall). Proof: Changes in ÿ affect only the union utility and not the firm’s profits. From (22) and 
(24) and also from relations (11), (14), (15) we can see that: 
Bwÿ  > 0 and ∂w/∂ÿ > 0 
 
Proposition 2 
An increase (decrease) in the unemployment benefit causes the union wage to increase (fall). 
Proof: Changes in b affect only the union utility function and not the firm’s profits. From the 
first  order condition, it is clear that the impact of a change in b has the same direction as a 
change in comparison income. Thus from the previous proposition we can see that: 
Bwb  > 0 and ∂w/∂b > 0 
 
Proposition 3 
An increase (fall) in the mark-up causes union wage to increase (fall). Proof: The same as 




Bwµ  > 0 and ∂w/∂µ > 0 
 
Proposition 4 
An increase  (decrease) in union power causes wages to increase (fall). Proof: we know that: 
            Φw        Πw  
 Bws    =  ----  -    ---       
             Φ         Π 
  
From relation (11) and the fact that   Πw   = -N we have: 
Bws  > 0 and ∂w/∂s > 0 
 
Proposition 5 
An increase (fall) to the weight that the union places on the comparison wage causes union 
wage to increase (decrease). Proof: from (22) and (24) and also from (11), (20) and (21) we 
can see that 
 Bwβ  > 0 and ∂w/∂β > 0 
 
V. Concluding Comments 
 
The starting point of this paper was the idea that there is a comparison or reference 
wage which enters the union utility function.  As we saw, the justification of  the presence of a 




findings from economic psychology. This implies that standard union behaviour models which 
do not take into account wage comparisons might be inadequate and limiting. The paper then 
discussed the effects of the presence of a comparison wage in a bargaining setting where the 
firm and the union negotiate over the wage in a partial equilibrium framework. The results 
showed that the union wage exhibits a positive relationship with the comparison wage, 
unemployment benefit, the mark-up over the industry wage, union power and the weight that 
the union places on the comparison wage. The results concerning unemployment benefit and 
union power are not surprising given the general literature on union behaviour (see for 
instance Pencavel, 1991; Booth and Chatterji, 1995; Hart and Moutos, 1995).  
However in the context of this paper, the rest of the results indicate the way that key 
variables are affected by the presence of the comparison wage in a union bargaining setting. 
For instance, if the union pays a lot of attention to other wage settlements in the industry then 
this will influence its own bargained wage and thus the level of employment. In particular, the 
concern that the union   exhibits over other wage settlements in similar sectors has a positive 
effect on  its own wage but a negative effect on the level of  employment. Furthermore, the 
empirical findings of the existence of wage interdependence among industries in many 
countries might be better explained if the idea of comparison wage is taken into consideration. 
Finally, one possible benefit of this  paper is that it might attract more attention to the wider 
effects of the idea of the comparison  wage especially in a general equilibrium setting where 
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